








































Commodity Money with  
Frequent Search 
 







November 16, 2010 
 
WP 2010-22 
 Commodity Money with Frequent Search
Ezra Obereld







A prominent feature of the Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) model of commodity money
is the multiplicity of dynamic equilibria. We show that the frequency of search is
strongly related to the extent of multiplicity. To isolate the role of frequency of search
in generating multiplicity, we (i) vary the frequency of search without changing the
frequency of nding a trading partner and (ii) focus on symmetric dynamic equilibria,
a class for which we can sharply characterize several features of the set of equilibria.
For any nite frequency of search this class retains much of the multiplicity. For each
frequency we characterize the full set of equilibrium payos, strategies played, and
dynamic paths of the state variables. Indexed by any of these features, the set of
equilibria converges uniformly to a unique equilibrium in the continuous search limit.
We conclude that when search is frequent, the seemingly exotic dynamics are irrelevant.
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In their seminal contribution, Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) introduced a search the-
oretic model of commodity money in which goods can function as a medium of ex-
change, sparking a voluminous literature exploring the microfoundations of money.
Characterizing the set of dynamic equilibria is an essential part of many applica-
tions. These models feature a large multiplicity of dynamic equilibria that includes
cycles, sunspots, and other non-Markovian equilibria. While multiplicity is in some
sense a natural feature of monetary models, it can also make analyzing dynamics a
challenging task.
This paper demonstrates the tight connection between the extent of multiplicity
and the frequency of search. We adapt the model parameters so that one can vary
the frequency of search without altering other features of the economy such as the
frequency of actually meeting trading partners in a given unit of time. Agents search
each period, but are less likely to nd a trading partner if the time period is short. By
varying the period length, we can study economies with dierent search frequencies.
We focus on the set of symmetric equilibria in an economy with symmetric param-
eters and initial conditions. Within this class of equilibria, the role of the frequency
of search is especially stark. With any strictly positive interval between search oppor-
tunities, the set of symmetric equilibria retains much of the multiplicity. In contrast,
in the limiting case in which agents search continuously there is a unique dynamic
equilibrium.
The fact that there are multiple equilibria with any strictly positive interval be-
tween search opportunities but a unique equilibrium with continuous search can give
the impression that there is a qualitative dierence between the two. If the relevant
interval between search opportunities is indeed positive, one might think that a model
1with continuous search may be ignoring potentially interesting and relevant dynam-
ics.1 We show that despite the qualitative dierence, the unique equilibrium of the
continuous search limit is a good approximation to every equilibrium when search is
frequent.
We characterize the set of payos consistent with a symmetric equilibrium for all
points in the state space. The size of this set varies directly with the probability of
meeting a trading partner within a single period, decreasing monotonically as search
becomes more frequent. While we cannot characterize the strategies played within
any particular period, we show that the average strategy played within any interval
of time converges uniformly to the strategies of the continuous search limit. Lastly,
we show that the set of equilibrium paths of the economy converges uniformly to the
equilibrium path of the continuous search limit. These results imply that if search is
frequent, all dynamic equilibria are well approximated by the unique equilibrium of
the continuous search limit.
The connection between multiplicity and frequency of search is a subtle one. To get
at this relationship, we rst describe the forces driving strategic decisions. Commodity
money arises because there is no double coincidence of wants. An individual may be
willing to trade for a commodity hoping to later meet a trading partner who desires
that commodity.
Individuals' strategies of whether to accept commodity money are linked tem-
porally. If those who produce the good that agent j wants will not be accepting
commodity money (the good j produce) in the future, then there is a stronger in-
1Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) write "...as monetary theorists we must be careful in writing the
basics of our models... continuous-time analysis simply sweep this fundamental issue under the
rug... Since these indeterminacy issues arise for any discrete but arbitrarily small time period this
resolution of the timing is articial." Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) were discussing how the timing
assumptions of purchases requiring cash (whether real balances before or after purchases enter the
utility function) aect determinacy with various interest rate rules. Fudenberg and Levine (2009)
show games of imperfect monitoring are another context in which the distinction between discrete
and continuous time is important.
2centive for j to trade for commodity money (the good the others want) now. In this
sense, trading for commodity money in one period and others not accepting it in
future periods (and vice versa) are strategic complements. This provides the key to
understanding the source of multiplicity.
The strategic complementarity weakens as search becomes more frequent. When
search is infrequent, agents are more likely to trade within each period, so the strategy
played within a single period has more inuence on payos in subsequent periods. As
a consequence, less frequent search corresponds to stronger complementarities, and
hence a larger set of equilibria.
Continuous search is special in that the complementarities disappear completely.
Stated dierently, for there to be multiple equilibria there must be negative serial
correlation in trading strategies. Just as there cannot be negative serial correlation
in continuous time, there cannot be negative serial correlation when agents search
continuously.
Our contribution is threefold. First, we point to little understood features of
a model that has served as a blueprint for the extensive literature exploring the
microfoundations of money. Many recent models share properties with the Kiyotaki
and Wright (1989) model, and multiplicity comes from the same sources. While
multiplicity is an important feature of these models, we paint a more full picture of
the forces driving it. Second, for this class of models, we provide reassurance that
when agents have frequent opportunities to search, little is lost when writing the
model with agents searching continuously, as the dynamic equilibria of the discrete
versions are well approximated by the continuous search model. This is useful because
characterizing dynamics under continuous search can be considerably easier than
in the discrete counterparts, especially in applications such as the evolution of an
economy following the introduction of at money or changes in the quantity of money.
Third, we make a methodological contribution by providing an approach to studying
3several features of the set of dynamic equilibria using easily accessible tools.
Our results are related to the ndings of Abreu, Milgrom, and Pearce (1991), who
study a continuously repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect monitoring. In that
model, lengthening the period over which actions are held xed increases the possibil-
ities for cooperation, expanding the set of feasible equilibrium payos. Similarly, in a
model of commodity money with infrequent search, the fact that strategies are held
xed for an entire period is a key feature that drives the large multiplicity of equilib-
ria. While the game studied by Abreu, Milgrom, and Pearce (1991) is purely a game
of coordination, the Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) model is an anonymous sequential
game (see Jovanovic and Rosenthal (1988)) in which strategic concerns play no role.
There are strategic complementarities that are inherently intertemporal, driven by
real changes in the distribution of holdings.
The relationship between period length and determinacy has also arisen in the real
business cycle literature. Several departures from the standard growth model lead
to indeterminacy (see Benhabib and Farmer (1999)). In some of these models, the
continuous time limit features a unique equilibrium. While supercially similar, these
and the Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) models have disparate sources of multiplicity,
and consequently the relationship between period length and multiplicity dier. In
versions of the RBC model with external eects that generate increasing returns, there
is typically a critical period length period length below which multiplicity disappears.2
Determinacy for a short enough time period (i.e., large enough discount factor) is
also a property of growth models that use an overlapping generations framework.3 In
contrast, in the Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) model, there is a continuum of dynamic
equilibria for any positive period length.
Section 2 lays out the economic environment while Section 3 describes symmetric
2See Hintermaier (2005).
3See Boldrin and Montrucchio (1986).
4equilibria. Section 4 gives examples of the many types of equilibria that can arise
and shows that these exist for any nite frequency of search. Section 5 contains our
main results: we characterize the set of perfect foresight equilibria and show how this
varies with the frequency of search. Section 6 extends these results to include sunspot
equilibria and we conclude in Section 7.
2 Model
There are three types of goods, labeled 1, 2, and 3, and a unit mass of innitely lived
individuals that specialize in consumption and production. There are three types of
individuals, with equal proportions, indexed by the type of good they produce and
like to consume: an individual of type i derives utility only from consuming good
i, and produces only good i + 1 (mod 3). Goods are indivisible and storable, but
individuals can only store one good (and hence one type of good) at a time. Storage
is costless.4
Time is discrete with h being the length of time elapsed between periods. Each
period, individuals search for trading partners. Search is successful with probability
(h):5 When an individual nds a potential trading partner, the two may exchange
goods. If a type i individual is able to acquire and consume good i, she derives
instantaneous utility u > 0. Immediately after consumption she produces a new unit
of good i + 1.
When two individuals meet, it will never be the case that each desires the good
produced by the other. Even though there is never a double coincidence of wants, an
4Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) allow for storage costs to vary by good and by type. We will
eventually specialize to a symmetric economic environment in which the storage cost is the same for
all goods. In that environment the level of the storage cost is not relevant for any economic decisions
or outcomes, so we avoid the extra notation by setting the storage cost to 0.
5If (h)  0h then the frequency of meeting a potential trading partner in a given unit of time
is roughly independent of h. We leave the functional form unspecied for greater generality.
5individual may accept a good that she does not want to consume in order to exchange
it later for the good she desires. In this way, the intermediate good acts as a medium
of exchange.
Individuals discount future ows with the discount factor (h) < 1. We assume
that (h) is strictly decreasing and that limh#0 (h) = 1 (e.g. (h) = e rh). In
addition, we assume that (h) is strictly increasing, and that limh#0
(h)
h = 0 so that
the continuous time limit is well dened.
Let I = f1;2;3g be both the set of goods and the set of types, and T = fnhg1
n=0
denote the set of times when individuals can search.
2.1 Strategies and Equilibrium
A strategy for individual i is a function i : I2 ! f0;1g, where i(j;k) = 1 if i
wants to trade good j for good k and i(j;k) = 0 otherwise. Following Kiyotaki and
Wright (1989) and Kehoe, Kiyotaki, and Wright (1993) we make the following two
assumptions. First we assume that i(j;k) = 1 if and only if i(k;j) = 0, so that if
an individual trades j for k she will not trade k for j. This ensures that an agent's
preferences between the good they produce and commodity money are independent
of the good they are currently holding. Second, we assume that in a given period,
agents of the same type choose the same (potentially mixed) trading strategy. This
ensures that the agent's willingness to exchange good j for k is independent of the
type, and holdings of the potential trading partner.6
Since u > 0, individuals will always want to trade for their desired good, so that
i(j;i) = 1 for all j. Given this, a strategy can be summarized by i(i + 1;i + 2),
6These assumptions are not without loss of generality. If the agents strictly prefer either the good
they produce or commodity money, then these assumptions would in fact be equilibrium outcomes;
when agents are indierent, there is no reason for these assumptions to hold. One could easily relax
the assumptions, but at the cost of more cumbersome notation. Since we will eventually focus on
symmetric equilibria, additional generality at this point adds nothing of substance to our analysis.
6an agent's willingness to trade the good she produces for commodity money. Let si
be the probability that type i wants to trade for commodity, i.e., plays the strategy
i(i + 1;i + 2) = 1.
There may be equilibria in which individuals coordinate their actions using the
realizations of a sunspot variable. Let fxtgt2T be an exogenous sequence of random
variables that are independent across time and uniformly distributed in the [0;1]
interval. Let  si
t be the strategy played by type i at time t. A history at the beginning

















A strategy for an individual is a sequence of functions si
t : Zt ! [0;1], giving the
trading strategy for each possible history.
Type i will never store good i; upon acquiring it, she immediately consumes it
and produces a new unit of good i + 1. Let pi
t : Zt h ! [0;1] denote the fraction of
individuals of type i storing good i+1 at the beginning of the period at time t following
the history zt h. The distribution of inventories at a point in time can be completely
summarized by the vector Pt (zt)  fpi
t (zt)gi2I. Given the trading strategies used at
time t, fsi
t (zt)gi2I, we can derive an equation describing the evolution of inventories
from t to t + h.
Following the accounting convention of Kiyotaki and Wright (1989), let V
i;j
t :
Zt ! R denote the present discounted value for type i storing good j at the end of
the period at time t for a given history. Given i's strategies, fsi
tgt2T, the strategies
of others, f si
tgi2I;t2T, and an initial condition, P0, V
i;j
t is well dened.7 We can write





























The expectation operator accounts for the uncertainty of meeting trading partners
and realizations of the sunspot variable xt, and Iu
t is an indicator of whether the
individual consumes her good at time t.
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At the beginning of period t, Pt describes the distribution of inventories, zt h the history of sunspots
and strategies played, and individual i is holding good j. The individual meets a trading partner
with probability (h) and the sunspot variable xt is realized. If she meets a trading partner, each
chooses a trading strategy st and trade may take place. If there is a trade, the individuals may
consume and produce new goods. V
i;~ j
t denotes the present discounted value at this point, where ~ j is
the good that individual i is storing at the end of period t. Discounting occurs in between periods.
The probability of trade and the expected payo from a meeting depend on the
types of individuals that meet and the goods each is storing. Table I shows the strate-
gies of both individuals and the potential payos for all possible relevant meetings.
We can use the probabilities of trade in Table I to produce an equation describing
the evolution of inventories pi
t as a function of the strategies chosen si
t. Assuming the
8Table I
Strategies and Payos from Encounters
i holding i + 1
Strategy of Probability Conditional Expected
Trading Partner i j of Trade Payo Payo















j = i + 1 holding i 1 1 1 u u







j = i + 2 holding i + 1 0 0 0 0 0
i holding i + 2
Strategy of Probability Conditional Expected
Trading Partner i j of Trade Payo Payo
j = i + 1 holding i + 2 0 0 0 0 0
j = i + 1 holding i 1 1   s
i+1
t 1   s
i+1

























j = i + 2 holding i + 1 1   si














This table describes the strategies and payos from the perspective of an individual of type i. The
top panel describes these when the individual is storing good i+1 while the bottom panel describes
these when storing i + 2. Column 1 lists the trading partner. Columns 2 and 3 give the strategies
of the individual and the trading partner respectively. Column 4 gives the probability of trade,
the product of columns 2 and 3. Column 5 gives the payo to the individual if the trade happens.
Column 6 gives the expected payo to the individual from the encounter, the product of columns 4
and 5.
history zt can follow from zt h, we have:
pi





















































The rst term is the probability that an individual of type i was storing good i+1
at t and is still storing good i + 1 at t + h. The second and third terms sum to the
probability that she was storing good i + 2 at t and is now storing i + 1 at t + h.
9We can also rewrite the sequential problem in equation (1) with a recursive repre-
sentation. For an individual of type i, there are two relevant cases, one for each good
that would be stored. The value of storing good i + 1 is,
V
i;i+1

















































































t+h, and the expectation is
taken only over realizations of the sunspot variable xt+h.
If holding good i + 1 is more valuable than holding i + 2, the strategy si = 0
is optimal (and si = 1 for the opposite case). If holding either good is equally
valuable then any strategy can be optimal. Dene i




t (zt)   V
i;i+2
t (zt). i denotes the dierence in value between storing i + 1 and











> > > <
> > > :
f0g if i
t (zt) > 0
[0,1] if i
t (zt) = 0
f1g if i
t (zt) < 0
(5)
We now dene an equilibrium.
Denition 1 For an initial condition, P0, an equilibrium is a sequence of inventories
10pi
t, trading strategies si
























= 0 holds for all i;j.
3 Symmetric Equilibria
We focus on symmetric equilibria in a symmetric environment: given a symmetric
initial condition P0 = fp0;p0;p0g, we study equilibria in which trading strategies
are symmetric (si
t = st for all i) and as a consequence inventories remain symmetric
(pi
t = pt for all i). In this case, the evolution of inventories in equation (2) reduces to






















(1   st (zt)) + pt
 
zt h (6)
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The following lemma will assist in the characterization of equilibria. Of particular
use, we show that if ftgt2T corresponds to value functions that satisfy the sequence
problem, then it must have a uniform bound.
Lemma 1 Given an initial condition p0, a sequence fpt;st;t hgt2T represents a
symmetric equilibrium if and only if (i) equations (5), (6), and (7) are satised and,
(ii) there exists B > 0 such that for every t, Pr
 t h
 
zt h   B
	
= 1.
11Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 1 implies that we can look for equilibria in the space fpt;st;t hgt2T.
3.1 Symmetric Steady State Equilibrium
In this section we show existence and uniqueness of symmetric steady state equilibria.
Kehoe, Kiyotaki, and Wright (1993) shows that with asymmetric storage costs there
are a nite number of steady state equilibria. We show that with symmetric costs
there is a unique symmetric steady state.


















+ pss + 2(1   pss)(1   sss) + pss
Since the denominator is positive, the value of ss and hence the optimal trading
strategy sss depend on the sign of sss pss. Consider rst the possibility that ss < 0:
this would imply sss = 1 and hence ss  0, a contradiction. Consider next ss > 0:
this would imply sss = 0 and hence ss  0, also a contradiction. The only remaining
possibility is ss = 0 which holds if and only if sss = pss which would be consistent
with the optimal choice of the trading strategy given in equation (5). Using the
evolution of inventories, equation (6), together with pt = st = pss for all t 2 T
provides pss = sss = 2
3.
3.2 The Zero Equilibrium
We next consider a special dynamic equilibrium and label it the the Zero Equilibrium.
As we will show below, an equilibrium of this type will be the unique surviving equi-
librium as the interval between search opportunities, h, goes to zero. The strategies
12of the Zero Equilibrium will also be helpful in characterizing the set of equilibria for
any xed h.
For any h, there exists a unique equilibrium for which t (zt) = 0 for all t;zt.
This equilibrium is Markovian, and the strategy played is always st = pt. This
condition implies that the probability of being able to obtain the desired good within
the period is independent of the good the agent is currently holding.8 It is easy to
see that equation (5) and equation (7) are both satised. For any initial condition p0,
one can nd the sequence of inventories by iterating equation (6). Such a sequence
fpt;st;t hgt2T satises the conditions of Lemma 1 and is therefore an equilibrium.
We construct the Zero Equilibrium by nding a sequence of strategies and inven-
tories so that individuals are indierent between accepting and rejecting commodity
money every period. When choosing a current strategy, individuals are concerned
with three quantities: the fraction of people holding the commodity money; the strate-
gies chosen by others; and the future relative value of holding commodity money. In
the Zero Equilibrium, the future relative value is zero by construction. If a larger
fraction of people are holding the good they produce (p "), trading for commodity
becomes more advantageous. If others are more willing to accept commodity money
(s "), there is less of a need to accept commodity money; others will accept the
produced good in exchange for the desired good. In the Zero Equilibrium these two
forces balance perfectly: when fewer people hold commodity money, more are willing
to accept it.
The same logic explains why there is a unique symmetric steady state, as this is
the Zero Equilibrium for a particular initial condition.
8If individual 1 is holding good 2 her probability of trading for good 1 with a type 2 is 1 p2 and
with type 3 is p3s3, so that the probability of trading for the desired good is 1   p2 + p3s3. If the
individual 1 is holding good 3 her probability of trading for good 1 with a type 2 is (1  p2)(1 s2)
and with type 3 is p3, so that the probability of trading for the desired good is (1 p2)(1 s2)+p3.
In a symmetric equilibrium these values are equated when s = p.
134 Indeterminacy
In this section we provide examples of several types of equilibria. We show that
for a xed frequency of search, there is a large multiplicity of dynamic equilibria.
Several examples are taken from Kehoe, Kiyotaki, and Wright (1993), who worked
with a model with asymmetric parameters and allow for asymmetric strategies. The
purpose of this section is to demonstrate that many of these types equilibria are still
present in an environment with symmetric parameters, even with the restriction of
symmetric strategies.
First we provide examples of deterministic equilibria that eventually converge to
the steady state. Figure 2 shows the evolution of the trading strategy s and inventories
p as a function of the elapsed time t for a particular equilibrium. The economy starts
with p0 = pss. We are interested in rationalizing an equilibrium with s0 > sss.
Since some traders will be acquiring commodity money, the fraction of individuals
holding their own produced good falls, ph < pss. From period h onward, the traders
play the strategies of the Zero Equilibrium. Each period, s and p move together,
balancing the incentives to accept and reject commodity money. At the end of the
initial period, these incentives are also balanced, regardless of the high value of the
initial trading strategy, s0.9 Therefore this is, indeed, an equilibrium. In fact, any s0
can be rationalized by playing sh = ph and then following the strategies of the Zero
Equilibrium.
This argument can be formalized and generalized. Notably, the argument is in-
dependent of the initial value of p0 and, given a particular p0, the initial strategy
chosen, s0. Given the initial condition p0, choose any s0. This gives ph. From ph
9It is true that both the trading strategy during the initial period and the lower fraction of
individuals holding their own good in future periods make commodity money less useful during the
initial period. But the only implication of this is that coming into the initial period, traders would
have preferred to have been holding their own produced good,  h > 0.
14Figure 2
Rationalizing Deterministic Equilibrium Paths
ss ss s p 
s
p s p 
t 0 h h 2
An example of a deterministic equilibrium that converges to the steady state.
there exists strategies consistent with equilibrium such that t = 0 for all t 2 T
(the strategies of the Zero Equilibrium). Since 0 = 0 the choice of s0 is optimal, a
fact that is independent of the value of  h. Because the choice of s0 was arbitrary,
each dierent s0 corresponds to a dierent dynamic equilibrium. There is therefore a
continuum of such deterministic dynamic equilibria.10
We can also construct cyclical equilibria. We provide an example for the following





. When n is odd the economy lies at f0:6737;1;0g, and
lies at f0:6659;0:3174; 0:0114g when n is even. In contrast to the Zero Equilib-
rium, cyclical equilibria are rationalized by the balance between current and future
incentives. In odd periods, more traders are willing to accept commodity money and
more are holding their own good. Both of these make it easy to get the desired good
using only the produced good, reducing the relative value of commodity money. In
10The idea for this type of equilibrium originates with a construction by Aiyagari and Wallace
(1992) with at money.
15even periods, it becomes harder to get the desired good using the produced good,
increasing the relative value of commodity money. These cycles persist as the period
length shrinks, a claim that we formalize in Appendix B.
Figure 3






The equilibrium is characterized by fpt;st;t hg. In this case: E = f0:6659;0:3174; 0:0114g and
O = f0:6737;1;0g. Parametrization: (h) = 0:1, (h) = 0:98 and u = 1.
Finally, we can also construct non-Markovian equilibria, combining the two previ-
ous examples. For the rst 2N  1 periods, individuals play the strategies associated
with the cyclical equilibrium described above. From period 2N on, all individuals
play the strategies associated with the Zero Equilibrium, so that t = 0. In fact, we
can construct an equilibrium in which every odd period the realization of the sunspot
x(2n+1)h determines whether the individuals continue to play the cyclical strategies or
the economy reverts to the Zero Equilibrium.
5 Perfect Foresight Equilibria
In this section we discuss perfect foresight equilibria. While individuals still face
uncertainty in terms of meeting trading partners, pt, st and t are no longer functions
of the sunspot variables fxtg and follow deterministic paths. We can therefore drop
16the expectation operator in equation (7).
5.1 Continuous Search
The dynamics of the limiting model in which agents search continuously are simple
and easy to describe. There is a unique equilibrium, in which agents choose st = pt
for all t > 0.
For the continuous time model to be well dened, recall that we assume the







be the instantaneous discount rate
and 0 = limh#0
(h)
h be the instantaneous meeting rate.
As h ! 0, we approach the continuous search limit. Using equation (6) and











rt = _ t +
0
3
u[st   pt]  
0
3
[ptst + 2(1   pt)(1   st) + pt]t (9)
It is straightforward to show the only symmetric equilibrium is the Zero Equilib-
rium, i.e., t = 0 for all t  0 and the optimal strategy must be st = pt. One can
extend the denition of symmetric equilibrium and Lemma 1 to the continuous case
and show that for any equilibrium, ftgt0 must have a uniform bound. First, note
that t > 0 implies _ t > rt and similarly t < 0 implies _ t < rt. Together,
these imply that if there is a t at which t 6= 0 then jj will grow exponentially and
without bound, violating Lemma 1. Lastly, observe that if t = 0, it must be that
st = pt for almost every t. These dynamics are summarized by the phase diagram in
Figure 4.
Note also that the paths of pt and t are continuous as the time derivatives of
17these objects are uniformly bounded. This is an important dierence between discrete
and continuous time as it restricts the acceptable strategies that are consistent with
equilibrium.
Figure 4








The unique equilibrium strategy sets st = pt such that t = 0 for all t. The equilibrium converges
to the unique steady state with pss = 2
3.
5.2 Properties of the Set of Perfect Foresight Equilibria
In this section we will characterize the set of state-payo combinations that are con-
sistent with a symmetric equilibrium for a xed interval between search opportunities
h. In order to do this, it is helpful to discuss the timing of the model. A strategy
at a given point in time, st, aects both the fraction of individuals storing each type
of good and the relationship between current and future present discounted values.
Inspection of equation (6) and equation (7) reveals that st+h is relevant for the rela-
tionship between t and t+h on the one hand, and pt+h and pt+2h on the other. In
other words, st+h determines the relationship between (pt+h;t) and (pt+2h;t+h).
18We now characterize the set of points that are consistent with a symmetric equi-
librium.
Proposition 1 Let fpt;st;t hgt2T be a sequence that satises equations (5), (6),






where (p)   (h)(h)p and (p)  (h)(h)(1   p) with (h) 
(h)
3 u.
Proof. See Appendix E.
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Figure 5, a partial phase diagram for a given interval between search opportunities,
h, gives a graphical representation of the main ideas in the proof of Proposition 1.
Note that on the vertical axis we plot 
(h). This corresponds to the value at the
beginning of the next time period, so that both pt+h and t
(h) refer to values at the
beginning of period t + h.
19The shaded area represents  (h) 
n
(p; 





set of possible state-payo combinations of (pt+h; t
(h)) that are consistent with a
symmetric equilibrium. One notable feature is that any point (p; 
(h)) in the shaded
area is consistent with an equilibrium in which (i) pt+h = p and t =  and (ii)
t+h = 0. In other words, the economy can go from that point to  = 0 in one
period.
Put dierently, if t h >  (pt) then the value today of holding the produced good
(relative to commodity money) is so high that no matter what happens this period,
the individual will still prefer to hold the produced good going into next period.
Therefore refusing commodity money (st = 0) is a dominant strategy. Similarly,
t h < (pt) guarantees that accepting commodity money (st = 1) is a dominant
strategy.
When more traders are holding their produced good, a given individual holding
her produced good has fewer potential trading partners. As a consequence, a larger
portion of the relative value of holding the produced good must be expected to arrive
in future periods, hence t is more likely to be positive. Therefore the threshold for
t h at which one can guarantee that t is positive must be decreasing in p. For
analogous reasons,  is also decreasing in p.11
If t h > (pt) then two things happen. First, the relative advantage of not
holding commodity money increases (t  (h) 1t h): since others are refusing to
accept commodity money this period, any advantage of holding the produced good
instead of commodity money could not have come from expected utility ow within
period t; the strategy can only be rationalized by expected gains in future periods.
For this to happen, the future relative value of holding the produced good must
11From the opposite perspective, when more traders are holding their produced good, refusing to
accept commodity money now makes it dicult to obtain the desired good in the future. It therefore
becomes even more dicult rationalize this refusal, and hence it is more dicult to sustain such an
equilibrium. As a consequence, (p) is decreasing in p.
20increase by at least the discount rate. Second, the fraction of individuals holding
commodity money falls (pt+h > pt). This means that next period there will be
even fewer potential trading partners for those without commodity money, making
it even harder to get utility ows next period. As a consequence, we can guarantee
t > (pt+h).12 The same reasoning holds in each future period, so that ftg grows
exponentially and eventually violates the uniform bound implied by Lemma 1. Such
a path is not consistent with equilibrium because this unboundedly large future value
never arrives.
When t h < (pt), the analysis is similar, with one slight complication. Here the
relative value of commodity money is so high that no matter what happens accepting
commodity money (st = 1) is the dominant strategy. By an identical argument one
can show that t  (h) 1t h: since others will be accepting commodity money, the
value of already having commodity money is low this period, and this must be made
up in future periods. The change in the fraction of people holding commodity money
is trickier. Among those holding commodity money, some will be able to trade their
commodity money for their desired good, so there is a natural force increasing the
fraction not holding commodity money (p). If every trader is accepting commodity
money, then the fraction holding their produced good would fall when p > 1
2 and rise
when p < 1
2. If p is falling, then by the same reasoning as above, we can guarantee
that t < (pt+h). When p is rising, commodity money is more likely to deliver the
desired good next period, so one might think it is possible that even with the increased
relative value of commodity money (jtj) that the relative value the following period
(t+h) need not be negative. However we can show algebraically that the increase in
magnitude of  is large enough to dominate the rise in p, and hence we can guarantee
12This can be seen graphically. If s = 0 is played, then the changes in  and p are both positive,
which means that the next point in the sequence is also above (p) (this can be seen from the slope
of (p)).
21that t < (pt+h) in this case as well. In either case, fjtjg grows exponentially
and eventually violates the uniform bound.
5.3 Frequency of Search and the Set of Perfect Foresight
Equilibria
The height of set of points consistent with symmetric equilibrium  (h) is given by
(h) =
(h)
3 u. As h decreases, the area of this set shrinks in proportion to (h).
In the limit, (h), and hence (h), approaches zero. In this case Figure 5 coincides
exactly with the phase diagram of the continuous search model depicted in Figure 4.
The only surviving equilibrium is the Zero Equilibrium.
The set of possible equilibrium payos is increasing with (h) as individuals are
more likely to nd a trading partner each period. This means that a larger fraction of
the payo comes from expected utility from a single search, and less from future ows.
As a consequence the set of future payos consistent with an initial value of t h is
larger, and in particular it is less likely that the sign of t, and hence the strategy
st, is pinned down. The set of points in the state-payo space  (h) are precisely the
combinations for which the sign of h is not pinned down.
We can also derive some properties of the sequence of inventories and trading
strategies that are consistent with equilibrium. We show that for any equilibrium,
the sequence of inventories is \close" to that of the Zero Equilibrium. More formally,
the set of sequences of inventories that are consistent with equilibrium converges
uniformly to the sequence of inventories of the Zero Equilibrium.
Proposition 2 For any h > 0 and p0, let fp0
tgt2T denote the sequence of inventories
of the Zero Equilibrium. For any equilibrium, for all t 2 T
 pt   p
0
t
   (h) (10)
22where limh!0 (h) = 0.
Proof. See Appendix D.1.
This proposition follows from the fact that both t and t+Nh must be within
bounds that shrink as search becomes more frequent and h falls. Given t, this puts
a restriction on the strategies that can be played between periods t and t + Nh. As
the bounds on  shrink, the evolution of p implied by those strategies within those
N periods is increasingly constricted and converges to that of the Zero Equilibrium.
To get further insight into this restriction on strategies, we can also show that
the strategies played will also be "close" to those of the Zero Equilibrium. The next
proposition shows that as search becomes more frequent, the local average of the
trading strategies converges to the strategies of the Zero Equilibrium.
Proposition 3 For " > 0, let N be the largest integer such that "  (2N+1)h. Then
in any equilibrium,










   

 (h;") (11)
holds for all t 2 T, with the property that lim"!0 (limh!0 (h;")) = 0
Proof. See Appendix D.2.
6 All Equilibria
The previous section discussed deterministic, perfect-foresight equilibria. Sunspot
equilibria can occur if particular strategies that are chosen depend on random vari-
ables that have no intrinsic eect on the economy; individuals may use the realizations
of the random variable to coordinate their strategies.
23Remarkably the set of state-payo combinations that are consistent with sunspot









zt2Zt;t2T be a sequence that sat-
ises equations (5), (6), and (7). This an equilibrium for an economy with initial






















where (p) =  (h)(h)p and (p) = (h)(h)(1   p) with (h) =
(h)
3 u
Proof. See Appendix E.
The idea behind the proof is similar to that of the perfect foresight case. We show
that if t h is above  then we can guarantee that there is a positive probability
that agents play the strategy st = 0. With this, we can show if  is above  with
positive probability, then there must be a positive probability that the sequence of 's
eventually violate the uniform bound given by Lemma 1. For any perfect foresight
equilibrium, a special case, these positive probabilities are equal to 1.
We can also extend Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 to the set of all equilibria
by adding expectations operators to the left hand sides of equation (10) and equa-
tion (11).13
13One might think it would be possible to give a uniform bound on jpt   p0
tj for almost every
zt. However, one can nd sunspot equilibria in which there is an arbitrarily small probability of an
arbitrarily long sequence of any trading strategies, as long as the  at the end of the sequence is
within the bounds at the end of the sequence. Because there were no restrictions on the sequence
of trading strategies, there are no restrictions on p at the end of the sequence.
247 Conclusion
The literature following Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) has studied economies with ex-
plicit search frictions to learn how these frictions aect economic behavior. We study
how a feature of the environment, the frequency of search, interacts with these search
frictions to shape potential equilibrium outcomes. In particular, we shed light on eco-
nomic forces in the model that can generate multiplicity, and show how these change
as search becomes more frequent.
We show that as search frequency increases, the set of dynamic equilibria shrinks
uniformly in three dimensions: (i) equilibrium payos associated a given state of
the economy; (ii) the average strategy played over any given unit of time; and (iii)
dynamic paths of the state variables.
To do this, we focus on symmetric equilibria in a symmetric environment. This
restriction allows us to cleanly characterize several dimensions of the set of dynamic
equilibria. While symmetric equilibria are often the object of interest14 a natural
question is how our results generalize to asymmetric equilibria or environments. In
these more general environments characterizing the set of equilibria is considerably
more dicult technically. While there may not be a unique dynamic equilibrium, we
conjecture that the set dynamic equilibria shrinks uniformly as agents search more
frequently (indexed by the characteristics we describe above). We further conjecture
that when search is frequent every equilibrium can be approximated by an element
of the set of continuous search equilibria. In other words, when search is frequent,
much of the multiplicity will not matter.
14See Kiyotaki and Wright (1993) for an early example.
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Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 1
We rst show that for any equilibrium that satises the conditions of Denition 1,
ft (zt)gzt2Zt;t2T has a uniform bound with probability 1. It is straightforward to
26show that value functions V
i;j
t (zt) can be bounded above and below by bounds that
are independent of zt and t. For the upper bound, we can assume that the individual
is able to consume at every chance meeting. For the lower bound we can assume that
the individual never consumes. The value function V
i;j
t (zt) can therefore be bounded




1 (h). It follows that t(zt) is bounded above and below by
bounds that are independent of zt and t. The other conditions of Denition 1 are
trivially satised.
Second, we show that if a sequence fpt;st;t hgt2T (i) satises equation (5),
equation (6), and equation (7) and (ii) ft(zt)gzt2Zt;t2T is uniformly bounded, then we




t h gt2T that is a symmetric equilibrium.
We need to show that one can construct a sequence of value functions that satisfy
the symmetric versions of equation (3), equation (4), and transversality.
For a given sequence, dene M1
t (zt) and M2





















(1   st(zt))(u + t(zt))






Iterating equation (3) and equation (4), and taking the limit as N ! 1 gives
V
i;i+1
 h (z h) = E h [
P1
n=0 (h)nM1








 h (z h) = E h [
P1
n=0 (h)nM2

























, then transversality must be sat-
ised. Since equation (3) and equation (4) are satised by construction, this is an
equilibrium.
B Two Period Cycles
In this section we show that in a neighborhood around h = 0, we can always construct
a two period cycle: in even periods the economy is at fe;pe;seg, and in odd periods
at fo;po;sog. We can evaluate equation (5), equation (6), and equation (7) at
the values of odd and even periods to obtain a system of four unknowns and two
restrictions. We will look for cycles in which so = 1 and e = 0, so the four equations
27become,
0 = o +
(h)





3 u[se   pe]





3 (1   pe)[2(1   pe)(1   se) + pe]





3 (1   po)po
These four equations will then determine the values of the unknowns, se, o, po,
and pe. To verify that such cycle exists, we must show that (i) o  0 (so that so = 1
is optimal), and (ii) that se 2 [0;1] (so that the cycle is feasible).
The rst equation implies that o  0, and with this the second equation implies
that se  pe  1. We must now verify that se  0. We can eliminate 0 and reduce
the system to the following three equations


















3 (1   po)po
0 = g(po)  P(po)  
(h)
3 P(po)2S(po)   po
+
(h)
3 (1   P(po))[2(1   P(po))(1   S(po)) + P(po)]
The third equation denes candidate values of po consistent with the specied cycle,
while the functions S and P give the corresponding values of se and pe respectively.
We can show that se is strictly increasing in po,
S
0(po) = 1   (h)po +
(h)
3










Let  po solve S( po) = 0. The inventory level  po is useful as it provides a lower






since S(1) = 1  
(h)









< 0, and S0(p) > 0.
Because S is strictly increasing, if we can nd a po 2 [ po;1) that satises g(po) = 0
then we can guarantee that se 2 [0;1].







3   P(1)3 + 2[1   P(1)]3   P(1)2





9 ((h)2   4(h) + 12)   2
28which is negative for any (h) 2 (0;1]. We next show that in a neighborhood around
h = 0, g( po) > 0. By the mean value theorem, this will guarantee that there is a
solution po 2 [ po;1), and consequently the existence of a two point cycle.
We can use the denition of P along with the fact that po   po > 1
2 to get




and therefore P(po) < po. Now we turn to evaluate g( po),
g( po) = P( po)    po +
(h)
3
[1   P( po)][2   P( po)]





g( po) = [1   P( po)][2   P( po)]    po (2 po   1)









o + 2 po   2








then we can guarantee that g( p0) > 0, and that there is a
cycle. Now, from the denition of S, we can see that limh!0 po = 1
2, so along with
the continuity of S, this implies that in a neighborhood around h = 0 this condition
will be satised.
C Proof of Proposition 1
We develop the proof as a sequence of claims. Let fpt;st;t hgt2T be a sequence
that satises equation (5), equation (6), and equation (7).
Claim 1 If t > (pt+h) then t+h > (pt+2h) and t+h  t=(h). Similarly, if
t < (pt+h) then t+h < (pt+2h) and t+h  t=(h).








t = 1  
(h)
3 [ptst + 2(1   pt)(1   st) + pt] 2 (0;1]. t > (pt+h) guarantees
that t+h > 0 and hence st+h = 0. Similarly, t < (pt+h) guarantees that t+h < 0
and hence st+h = 1.
Another rearrangement of equation (7) gives
(h)t+h   t =  (h)
(h)
3
u(st+h   pt+h) + (h)(1   
t+h)t+h
If t+h > 0, then st+h = 0 and hence (h)t+h  t. Similarly, if t+h < 0, then
st+h = 1 and hence (h)t+h  t.
We can also rearrange equation (6) to be
pt+2h   pt+h =
(h)
3
fpt+h(1   2pt+h)st+h + (2   pt+h)(1   pt+h)(1   st+h)g
If st+h = 0 then pt+2h  pt+h. If st+h = 1 then the sign of pt+2h   pt+h depends on
whether pt+h ? 1=2.
Consider rst the case of t > (pt+h). We have shown that t+h  t and
that pt+2h  pt+h. These, along with the fact that  is decreasing in p imply that
t+h > (pt+2h).
Now consider t < (pt+h). We have shown that t+h  t. If in addition
pt+h  1=2, then pt+2h  pt+h. These along with the fact that  is decreasing in p
imply that t+h < (pt+2h).
If, however, pt+h < 1=2 then we cannot rely on this argument because pt+2h > pt+h.




(1   (h))t+h   (h)
h
(h)

















Starting with t <  (h)(h)pt+h, we have that
t+h <  (h)(h)pt+2h + (h)(h)pt+h + t
<  (h)(h)pt+2h
< (pt+2h)
30which completes the proof
Claim 2 Let fpt;st;t hgt2T be a sequence that satises equations (5), (6), and















for all N > 0. Therefore jt+Nhj 
(h) Njtj. This would violate the uniform bound on ftg, so the sequence cannot
be an equilibrium.




for all t 2 T then the sequence ftg has a
uniform bound. By Lemma 1, the sequence is consistent with equilibrium.
D Proofs of Proposition 2 and Proposition 3
We rst prove a preliminary result that will help us prove Proposition 2 and Propo-
sition 3. Let fpt;st;t hgt2T be an sequence consistent with equilibrium.
Lemma 2 For any N > 0, the following inequality holds:
N X
n=1
!t;n;N (st+nh   pt+nh)  2
1   (h)(1   (h))















3 [pt (1 + st) + 2(1   pt)(1   st)]

.




u(st+h   pt+h) + t+ht+h





















j=1 is dened to be 1.


































, we can bound the right hand side of this equa-






n 1, while the magni-
tude of the numerator is less than 2(h)(h). These give the following bound:
N X
n=1





























which completes the proof.
D.1 Proof of Proposition 2
In any equilibrium, the sequence of inventories follows the equation






tst + 2(1   pt)
2(1   st) + pt(1   pt)

Similarly, the sequence of inventories for the Zero Equilibrium must also follow the
law of motion. Combining these equations give
pt+h   p
0
t+h = t(st   pt)   t(pt   p
0
t)
where t and t are dened and bounded as follows
t = 1  
(h)
3 f [3(pt + p0
t)   4]p0
t   3 + (pt + p0
t) + p2














































where again the product
QN 1
n=N is dened to be one.
We now provide a bound on the divergence of inventories from those of the Zero
Equilibrium among the rst N periods. Since p0 = p0
0 and jst   ptj  1 we can
use equation (16) and the upper bounds on  and  given by equation (14) and
equation (15) to get:


























N to be this bound.
We next provide a bound on the subsequent divergence of inventories from those










































t t;n;N(st+nh   pt+nh) can be bounded
by a function ~ 1(h;N). This is useful because equation (17) would then imply that
if jpt   p0






To do this, we rst show that jt;Nj  1. Since  is increasing in each t, we can



































+ (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We will bound each of these three terms separately. First, note that equation (6)
implies
jpt+h   ptj =
(h)
3
















    
(h)
3 (pt+nh   pt)(3(pt+nh + pt)   4)
t
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34This, in combination with the bounds on ! from equation (13) imply that
jt;n;N   !t;n;Nj  1
N max2f 1;1g



























t;n;N(st+nh   pt+nh)  ~ 1(h;N)
with















At this point we have shown that for any N, inventories in the rst N periods
are within ~ 0(h;N) of those of the Zero Equilibrium. We have also shown that if
inventories in the rst N periods are within " of those of Zero Equilibrium for any
quantity "  ~ 1(h;N), then inventories in all subsequent periods are as well. We can
combine these two statements to arrive at a uniform bound for the entire sequence.
Dene ~ (h;N) = maxf~ 0(h;N); ~ 1(h;N)g. We therefore have that for any N > 0
and any t 2 T, inventories are within ~ (N;h) of those of the Zero Equilibrium:
 pt   p
0
t
   ~ (h;N)
Let (h) = minN ~ (h;N). This will be a bound for jpt   p0
tj.
Lastly, we can show that limh!0 (h) = 0. Let (h) = h 1=2. From the denitions
of ~ 0 and ~ 1 it is straightforward to show that limh!0 ~ 0(h;(h)) = limh!0 ~ 1(h;(h)) =
0. Since (h)  ~ (h;(h)), these imply that limh!0 (h) = 0.
D.2 Proof of Proposition 3
In a similar way, we can show that, at least locally, the average trading strategy
played coincides with that of the Zero Equilibrium.
For " > 0, let N be the largest integer such that "  (2N + 1)h. We can form a




































n= N (pt+nh   pt)
 



























The second summation can be bounded using equation (12). The third term can be
bounded using the fact that jpt+h   ptj  (h), which can be seen from equation (6).
This implies that 










































It follows that lim"!0 (limh!0 (";h)) = 0.
E Proof of Proposition 4
We develop the proof as a sequence of claims. For ease of exposition we drop the
argument z from pt, st, and t.
Let fpt;st;t hgzt2Zt;t2T be a sequence that satises equation (5), equation (6),
and equation (7). Also, Let Gt;n be the event that t jh 62 [(pt (j 1)h);(pt (j 1)h)]
for all j 2 (0;:::;n). We can make the following claims about the sequence:
Claim 3 If Pr(Gt;n) > 0 then Pr










3 [ptst + 2(1   pt)(1   st) + pt]. Note that 
t 2 [0;1]. Also let
Xt+h =  t + (h)t+h + (h)
(h)
3 (st+h   pt+h)u   (h)
t+ht+h. equation (7)
can be rewritten as 0 = Et [Xt+h], where Et() = E( jzt). This implies both that
Pr(Xt+h  0jzt) > 0 and also that Pr(Xt+h  0jzt) > 0 for all zt. We therefore have
that if Pr(Gt;n) > 0 then either Pr
 
Gt;n and t > (pt+h) and Xt+h  0

> 0 or
Pr(Gt;n and t < (pt+h) and Xt+h  0) > 0. We will show that in either case
Pr







First, consider the event in which t > (pt+h). If t+h  0, then it must be
that Xt+h < 0, because t > (pt+h)  (h)
(h)
3 (st+h   pt+h)u. Consequently, if
Xt+h  0, then t+h > 0 and therefore st+h = 0. The combination of Xt+h  0
and st+h = 0 imply that t+h  t
(h) and pt+2h > pt+h. Since (p) is decreasing in
p, these also imply that t+h > (pt+2h). We therefore have that in the event that
t > (pt+h) and Xt+h  0, then t+h 62 [(pt+2h);(pt+2h)] and jt+hj 
jtj
(h).
Now we turn to the event in which t < (pt+h), Xt+h  0, and t+h < 0. We
will show that in this case t+h < (pt+2h). This is more dicult because the change
in p is not a monotonic function of p. If t < (pt+h) then in a similar manner as














We take two cases separately. For each we will show that if t is below the bound,
than t+h is below the bound as well. (i) If pt+h  1
2, then we can show this in a
similar manner as above. Since pt+2h  pt+h and t+h < t < 0, the fact that (p)




(1   (h))t+h   (h)
h
(h)












where the last inequality follows because pt+h < 1
2 and
(h)
3 < 1. We start with
t <  (h)(h)pt+h. We then have that
t+h <  (h)(h)pt+2h + (h)(h)pt+h + t
<  (h)(h)pt+2h
< (pt+2h)
For both cases we also know that Xt+h  0. This, in combination with st+h = 1,
implies that t+h  t
(h).
If t+h  0 then we know that Xt+h > 0 because t < (pt+h)  (h)
(h)
3 (st+h 
pt+h)u. This implies that if Xt+h  0, then t+h < 0. We have therefore shown that
if t < (pt+h) and Xt+h  0, then t+h 62 [(pt+2h);(pt+2h)] and jt+hj 
jtj
(h).




, then the following  is outside
the bounds with positive probability and the magnitude grows exponentially.




> 0 then a sequence of inventories, strate-








zt2Zt;t2T is not consistent
with equilibrium.
Proof. Let B be the uniform bound implied by Lemma 1. Assume that there exists a




> 0. This implies that there exists  > 0
such that Pr
 
t0 62 [(pt0+h);(pt0+h)];jt0j > 












Since there exists an N > 0 such that 
(h)N > B, we have Pr(jt+Nhj > B) > 0.
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